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TAXATION
OVERVIEW
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered a
limited number of cases'involving federal taxation. Due to the
relatively small number of cases and to make the survey of this
area as complete as possible, most of these cases will be dis-
cussed.'
King v. United States2 involved a number of tax-related is-
sues raised in the determination of the amount and the validity
of taxes assessed and liens filed by the IRS pursuant to the assess-
ments in proceedings for arrangement under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act.' Of primary interest' was the Tenth Circuit's
affirmation of the district court finding that a price adjustment
clause in an agreement for the sale of the taxpayer's corporate
stock to his children's trust could be enforced to defeat an assess-
ment of gift tax under section 2512(b). King had sold stock of a
closely held corporation to his children's trusts. The price adjust-
ment clause in question appeared in the letters of agreement for
the sales.5 The price agreed upon by King and the trustee was
All citations to the Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended;
all citations to sections refer to sections of the Code.
2 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976).
4 The other issues treated by the Tenth Circuit in this case involved findings that:
(1)King was entitled to an ordinary loss deduction under § 165(c)(2) for losses incurred
as a result of abandonment or worthlessness of oil and gas leases in which King had held
a net operating profits interest; (2)an interest equalization tax under Pub. L. No. 88-563
(1964), formerly I.R.C. §§ 4911-4922, repealed for tax years after 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 1904(a)(21), should not be assessed for the taxpayer's acquisition of 40,000 shares
of foreign securities; (3)a loan is not a "sale or exchange" for purposes of the Interest
Equalization Act, Pub. L. No. 88-563 (1964), formerly I.R.C. §§ 4911-4922, repealed for
tax years after 1976 by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1904(a)(21) (1976), and, therefore, taxpayer
was properly assessed under the former I.R.C. § 4911(b)(1)(A) for the 173,500 shares of
foreign securities purchased with monies from loans.
King had created trusts for each of his four children. The clause in question ap-
peared in the letters of agreement reflecting sales by King of the closely held stock of The
Colorado Corporation to the trustee of the trusts. Each letter provided that King was to
retain title to the stock as security for payment of the purchase price, and in addition,
each letter contained the following language:
However, if the fair market value of The Colorado Corporation stock as of
the date of this letter is ever determined by the Internal Revenue Service to
be greater or less than the fair market value determined in the same manner
described above, the purchase price shall be adjusted to the fair market
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later redetermined by the IRS, and a gift tax assessed against
King for the difference resulting from the increased value of the
stock.' The government argued that the price adjustment clause
could not be given effect to alter the terms of an already com-
pleted transfer and thereby avoid gift tax on the increased value
as determined by the IRS. In making this argument, the IRS
relied on authorities dealing with contingencies which, upon the
happening of the contingency, altered or destroyed the nature of
the transaction.7 However, the Tenth Circuit found that the pro-
vision for the adjustment of the purchase price of the stock "did
not affect the nature of the transaction." 8 The Tenth Circuit fur-
ther supported its decision to allow the price adjustment proviso
to effectively insulate the transaction from gift tax by finding that
King had intended the transaction as a sale and not as a gift?
However, Judge Doyle's strong dissent on this issue pointed out
that the subjective motives of the donor should not be determina-
tive for purposes of the application of the gift tax to a transfer.'0
The majority in King found further that the transaction in
question "was made in the ordinary course of business at arm's
length, free from any donative intent."" Therefore, under the
Treasury regulations, the transaction was not subject to gift tax.
12
Observation: Although a technique such as the one in ques-
tion would be valuable in situations where, as here, the subject
value determined by the Internal Revenue Service.
545 F.2d at 703-04.
1 The agreed price for the sale of the stock was $1.25 per share. The IRS deter-
mined that the stock had a fair market value of $16.00 per share at the date of the transfer
and assessed a gift tax against King for the difference. Id. at 704.
1 In this argument, the IRS relied substantially upon Commissioner v. Procter, 142
F.2d 824 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944). The IRS also argued that for
accounting purposes, tax consequences are fixed at the end of fixed accounting periods,
regardless of the effect of subsequent events, and that taxpayers cannot retroactively
amend a transaction to avoid federal tax consequences of earlier taxable periods. 545 F.2d
at 705.
O 545 F.2d at 705.
* Id. at 705-06.
10 Id. at 713. The majority recognized that, generally, absence of a donative intent
will not in itself prevent taxation of a transfer as a gift, but found this not to be controlling
where, as here, the transfer was found to have been made at arm's length. Id. at 706.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1977) provides in part that "a sale, exchange, or other
transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona
fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
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of the sale is difficult to value and may subsequently be revalued
by the IRS, caution is advised in relying upon a price adjustment
clause to avoid later adverse gift tax consequences upon revalua-
tion. As pointed out in the dissent, such a price adjustment clause
is in conflict with the general rule that once a transaction and a
tax year are completed, the tax consequences attach and retroac-
tive adjustments in the transaction are not allowed to alter these
tax consequences. 3 The effect of allowing such clauses will be
substantial, and it may be anticipated that the IRS will continue
to oppose such price adjustment clauses.
In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,' the Tenth Circuit
considered, on remand from the Supreme Court, 5 the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine of official immunity to IRS agents." The Su-
preme Court had determined that while levying on property pur-
suant to a jeopardy assessment the IRS agents, by making a
warrantless entry into the plaintiff's cottage, had made an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The Su-
preme Court, upon its finding that plaintiff's constitutional rights
had been violated, remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for
consideration of the issue of damages against the individual
agents. 8 On remand, the court of appeals reiterated the general
rule that a cause of action for damages will lie against a federal
officer or agent who violates Fourth Amendment rights under
color of his authority."' On the remaining issue of whether the
doctrine of official immunity would shield the IRS agents from
such an action, the Tenth Circuit declined to invoke the protec-
tion of absolute immunity in these circumstances. 20 Instead, the
court applied a standard of limited immunity, which protects an
IRS agent from liability if he acts in good faith upon a reasonable
belief that his conduct is proper. 2'
'" 545 F.2d at 714.
14 560 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir. 1977).
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
IS Traditionally, the doctrine of official immunity protects officials from damage suits
for acts done in the course of their duties. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), for a
statement of the doctrine.
"7 429 U.S. at 340.
" Id. at 341.
" 560 F.2d at 1013.
" Id. at 1015.
" Id. In formulating this standard, the court relied on Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), which applied a similar standard of limited
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Marvel v. United States"2 presented a case of first impression
to the Tenth Circuit. Taxpayers sought review of a district court
order denying their motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the IRS from levying on taxpay-
ers' assets during the pendancy of their suit for refund and abate-
ment of allegedly unpaid FICA, federal withholding, and federal
unemployment taxes.13 This case presented somewhat unusual
circumstances insofar as the taxpayer had paid only a portion of
the allegedly owing taxes and there was a possibility of an IRS
seizure of the taxpayer's property during the pendancy of the
refund proceedings."' Only a portion of the allegedly owing taxes
had been paid because, under the "divisible taxes" rule, certain
taxes are considered to be divisible per transaction or event. The
jurisdiction of the district courts may be invoked by payment of
the assessed taxes for any one transaction or event without pay-
ment of the full assessment.2 Taxpayers had made such a partial
payment of the allegedly owing taxes,'2  and sought injunctive
relief from seizure of their assets during the pendancy of the
litigation.
In Marvel, the statute under consideration was section
7421(a) [the Anti-injunction Act]. The Act provides that no ac-
tion may be maintained for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment of any tax, except as allowed in certain specific statutes.'
immunity. In applying this standard in G.M. Leasing, the Tenth Circuit found that the
agents had in good faith believed that they were acting in accordance with the law in
entering the cottage without a warrant. Id.
n 548 F.2d 295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977).
" 548 F.2d at 297.
2 I.R.C. § 6331 allows the IRS to levy upon the property of a person liable for a tax,
if the tax has not been paid.
0 Before a suit for a tax refund may be maintained in a district court or in the court
of claims, the taxpayer must first pay the taxes which are contested. Flora v. United
States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). However, Flora also created an exception to this rule for taxes
which were "divisible." Flora stated this divisible-taxes rule with regard to excise taxes,
but the exception that only partial payment need be made has been extended to other
types of divisible taxes, including employment and social security taxes. Steele v. United
States, 280 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960).
" Taxpayers, on November 6, 1974, paid the employment taxes of one of the alleged
employees for each of the periods in question. 548 F.2d at 296.
27 I.R.C. § 7421(a) provides:
Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213 (a), and 7426 (a) and
(b)(1), and 7429 (b), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether
or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
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This statute had been strictly construed on previous occasions by
the Supreme Court, but all of the previous cases involved suits
for injunctive relief prior to any payment of the taxes assessed.
However, the Supreme Court had never ruled directly on the
availability of injunctive relief in suits for refund of taxes paid.
The taxpayers argued to the Tenth Circuit that without injunc-
tive relief from seizure during such partial payment refund suits,
the "divisible taxes" exception to the general rule requiring full
payment of taxes to invoke jurisdiction for a claim for refund
would be, in effect, meaningless. The IRS could, by levying on
taxpayers' assets, unilaterally require full payment of the as-
sessed taxes at any time, and thereby circumvent the exception
allowing partial payment for divisible taxes. The Tenth Circuit
declined to create a judicial exception to the Anti-injunction Act
for refund cases involving partial payment of assessed taxes, and
upheld the district court's denial of injunctive relief."9
Observation: This holding supports the emerging trend of
strict construction and enforcement of the Anti-injunction Act, in
contrast with earlier decisions which seemed to be willing to
apply a more liberal standard of judicial interpretation to the
language of the statute.
30
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. United States31 presented an-
other issue of first impression to the Tenth Circuit. Monfort, in
its operation as a large cattle finisher, buys tremendous quanti-
ties of feed subject to frequent and substantial price changes. In
an effort to lend some price stability to its feed acquisitions,
Monfort participated as a hedger in the grain futures market. 3 As
a hedger, Monfort's commodity transactions were solely for the
" See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974). Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., Inc., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), created one exception to the general
rule that injunctions could not be maintained to restrain the assessment of a tax. Under
the Williams Packing exception, a showing "that under no circumstances could the Gov-
ernment ultimately prevail" and that "equity jurisdiction otherwise exists," would make
injunctive relief available. Id. at 7.
" The taxpayers in Marvel made an alternative argument that they satisfied the
Williams Packing requirements and should therefore be given injunctive relief. The Tenth
Circuit, however, found that they did not meet the "under no circumstances" test of
Williams Packing and therefore were not entitled to an injunction. 548 F.2d at 300-01.
" See Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932).
3' 561 F.2d 190 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 406 F. Supp. 701 (D. Colo. 1976).
" Within a commodity market such as grain, hedgers contract to buy or sell a certain
quantity of grain on a specific date at an established price.
1978
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purpose of inventory cost protection, and not for investment or
speculation.33 Initially, Monfort reported its gains and losses on
the futures market as separate income items or as direct adjust-
ments to its costs of goods sold.Y In 1967, however, several years
after its entry into the futures market as a hedger, Monfort began
utilizing its futures market gains or losses as direct adjustments
to its ending inventory.3 By 1967-1968, Monfort was also active
in the relatively new commodity market developed for live cattle.
As a result, Monfort reduced its 1968 ending cattle inventory by
the amount of its 1968 cattle futures gain.3 Since 1951, Monfort
had utilized the last-in-first-out method (LIFO) to establish its
inventories and costs of sales for income tax purposes.37 Upon its
review of Monfort's 1968 return, the IRS determined that Mon-
fort's treatment of its hedging gains did not clearly reflect its
income as required by the Treasury regulation, section 1.446-
1(a)(2).3 In addition, the IRS determined that Monfort's treat-
ment of its hedging gains constituted a change in accounting
methods made without prior approval of the Secretary or his
delegate as required by I.R.C. section 446(e). 9
In Monfort, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
finding that hedging gains and losses as a direct adjustment to
inventory accurately reflected Monfort's acquisition costs and
that this practice was in keeping with the Treasury regulations
which allow flexibility in valuations of inventory in order to give
effect to trade customs. 0
The decision in Monfort also upheld the district court with
regard to the second issue of whether Monfort's treatment of its
hedging gains constituted a change of accounting method without
approval. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's find-




' Id. at 191.
- 26 C.F.R. 1.446-1(c)(2) (1977).
3 The Tenth Circuit found it significant that the IRS expert, in his testimony before
the district court, acknowledged that there was nothing in the treasury regulations which
specifically prohibited Monfort's tax treatment of its hedging gains. Id. at 193.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(b) states: "inventory rules cannot be uniform but must give
effect to trade customs which come within the scope of the best accounting practice in
the particular trade or business."
VOL. 55
TAXATION
ing that Monfort had not changed its method of accounting by
its treatment of its hedging gains as an adjustment to inventory."
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand' presented another
issue of first impression to the Tenth Circuit. The IRS appealed
the district court's denial of enforcement of an IRS summons,
issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 7602,' 3 directing Coopers & Ly-
brand [C&L], an independent auditing firm, to testify and pro-
duce its books relative to its examination and audit of Johns-
Manville's [J-M] consolidated financial statements for 1971 and
1972. C&L had responded with "voluminous workpapers and doc-
uments"" but had refused to provide its audit program and the
tax pool analysis file. The denial was made upon the ground that
both sets of documents were irrelevant to the preparation of J-M's
1971 and 1972 tax returns which were the subject of the IRS
investigation. C&L functioned solely in an auditing capacity and
did not participate in either the preparation or review of J-M's
federal tax returns;' 5 J-M's returns were prepared internally.
Thus neither the audit program" nor the tax pool analysis file'
was used in the preparation of J-M's 1971 or 1972 tax returns.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the IRS argument that the tax
pool analysis file was relevant to the IRS audit of J-M's tax re-
11 561 F.2d at 197.
2 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975).
" 26 U.S.C.A. § 7602 authorizes the Secretary:
(t)o summon . . . any person having possession, custody, or care of books of
account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax .. .to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place
named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other
data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material
to such inquiry ....
" 550 F.2d at 617. The court noted that C&L's cooperation with the IRS, except for
the two sets of documents in issue, had been extensive. Id. at 619.
" Id. at 617.
" The audit program is a master plan developed by C&L specifically for use in
auditing J-M. The plan contains no factual data regarding J-M corporate transactions,
but consists solely "of a listing of procedures to be followed by C&L personnel throughout
the United States in examining books and records of J-M, documentation of the extent
to which such proceedings were followed, and suggestions for the future modification of
such procedures." Id. at 618.
" The tax pool analysis file "prepared by J-M personnel contains its estimates of J-
M's contingent liabilities for future income tax periods." Id. at 617. The file is used by J-
M to prepare financial statements in compliance with SEC requirements; it is also used
by C&L to verify that J-M's financial statements are prepared according to generally
accepted accounting principles. Id.
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turns because "it might show tax fraud, because it might show
substantial tax liability, and because it would be relevant to show
and establish the state of mind of employees at the time the
returns were filed." 8 Such an argument, the court noted, would
lead to a virtually unlimited discovery power.49
While the court acknowledged that the IRS' authority under
section 7602 was extensive, 50 it noted the limitations on the
agency's investigative powers:
Although the IRS need not establish probable cause prior to the
issuance of a summons, it must establish that the investigation is
pursuant to and relevant to a legitimate purpose; that the informa-
tion is not already available; that a determination has been made
by the secretary or his delegate that further examination is neces-
sary; and that the other administrative steps required by the Code
have been followed."1
This standard, the court noted, had been applied frequently to
sustain the validity of a summons directed to a third party. 5 In
these cases, however, "the documents summoned dealt directly
with the taxpayer's return as filed or were a source of information
for the retum" while in this case the court stressed that C&L
had no responsibility for J-M's tax returns. The court cited with
approval the Eighth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Matras:5' "the government should not, for the mere sake of its
convenience, impose unnecessary burdens on a taxpayer in con-
ducting an audit or investigation for tax liability. The term
'relevant' connotes and encompasses more than 'convenience." ,,
" Id. at 619. The investigation of J-M's 1971 and 1972 returns was part of a continuing
review: the IRS had audited every J-M return since 1913. Id. at 617.
"[E]xtending IRS contentions herein to their logical conclusion, it is
hard to determine what corporate records would not fall under a § 7602
summonses if the standard endorsed the production of any records which
might show tax fraud or tax liability. IRS does not, as it appears to assume
on this appeal, have carte blanche discovery."
Id. at 619.
10 Id. (citing SEC v. First Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1038 (1972), and United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45
(10th Cir. 1974)).
11 550 F.2d at 619-20 (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)).
52 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
0 550 F.2d at 620.
- 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
u 550 F.2d at 621. The court also noted the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States
v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (1973), that judicial protection against an irrelevant and over-
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After repeating once again that the tax pool analysis file "was not
prepared in connection with or used to facilitate the preparation
and filing of J-M's tax returns and that C&L has no responsibility
for any J-M tax matters,"" the court affirmed the trial court's
finding that the tax pool analysis file was not relevant and there-
fore not subject to production under the summons.57
In United States v. United Banks of Denver," the Tenth
Circuit considered whether the taxpayer's interest in a testamen-
tary trust fund constituted "property" or "rights to property"
which would allow a federal tax lien to attach under section
6321.1' The Tenth Circuit found that local (Colorado) law would
be determinative of the nature of the property rights of the tax-
payer." Only after such determination under local law should
resort be made to federal law to ascertain whether the property
rights so determined constitute "property" or "rights to prop-
erty" within the meaning of the federal tax lien statute. The
Tenth Circuit certified the question of the nature of the tax-
payer's interest to the Colorado Supreme Court"' and, upon the
decision of the Colorado court, reversed and remanded the case
to the federal district court for reconsideration in view of the
ruling by the Colorado Supreme Court.
In Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner,"2 the Tenth
broad summons was particularly appropriate where a third party was involved. 550 F.2d
at 621.
"550 F.2d at 621.
7 Id. The court also upheld the district court's finding with respect to the audit
program noting that "Imere convenience does not make an item producible under an
IRS summons." Id.
542 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1976).
" I.R.C. § 6321 states:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addi-
tion to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue
in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person (emphasis added).
542 F.2d at 821-22.
In Re Question Submitted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, 553 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1976). The question certified to the supreme court was
whether taxpayer's interest in the trust created in his favor under his father's will was a
future interest subject to a condition precedent or a vested remainder subject to a com-
plete defeasance on the happening of a condition subsequent.
-2 554 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1977).
1978
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Circuit upheld the findings of the Tax Court13 as to the useful life
of certain structures for which a business depreciation deduction
had been claimed under section 167(a).14 The court held that the
determination of the useful life of a building and its component
parts is a factual one, 5 and, therefore could not be reversed on
appeal unless clearly erroneous-unless the "reviewing court
• . .is left with a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.' "67
In finding that such a mistake had not been made, the Tenth
Circuit first noted that the IRS' own policy of not altering a
taxpayer's estimate of the useful life of a structure 8 must be
considered in light of the "well established rule that the Commis-
sioner's determination, once made, is presumptively correct and
that the burden is on the taxpayer to show error."69 The court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that the number of witnesses
should be a factor in whether or not that burden is met. The
taxpayer had argued that its three witnesses should have been
more convincing than the Commissioner's one; but the court
noted that "[t]he weight of the evidence does not necessarily
depend on the number of witnesses called by a party, and the
credibility to be given a witness is a matter for the Tax Court.
70
Finally, the court rejected the taxpayer's allegation that the Tax
Court's determination had been made in a "rather hit-or-miss
fashion and by the flip of a coin. ' ' 7' The Tenth Circuit noted that
"it is not our function . . . to attempt to psychoanalyze the Tax
Court and go behind its written findings and speculate as to its
thinking processes. Our task is simply to determine whether the
Tax Court's several findings are supported by evidence and are
not clearly erroneous.
7 2
United States v. Smith7 3 involved an attempt by taxpayers
- 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 33.333 (1975).
" Section 167 permits as a depreciation deduction an allowance for wear and tear on
property used in a business.
" 554 F.2d at 415.
u Id.
hId.
0 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418.
0 554 F.2d at 415.
70 Id. at 416.
71 Id.
72 Id.
" Nos. 76-1854 and 76-1855 (10th Cir., May 12, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
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to invoke their Fifth Amendment" privilege against self-
incrimination and thereby not state their earnings on their in-
come tax returns. Recognizing the general rule that while the
Fifth Amendment allows a party to object to particular questions
on a return, it does not allow a party to refuse to make any return
at all, 5 the Tenth Circuit found that taxpayers' failure to set forth
their earnings was tantamount to not filing any return at all. On
this basis, the court of appeals rejected the claim of the taxpayers
that the good faith exercise of their privilege against self-
incrimination was a valid defense against an action for willfully
failing to make a tax return."6
In Dowell v. United States 7 the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's decision that a "sponsorship gift" of $22,500 by
the taxpayer to the Oral Roberts Evangelistic Association was
deductible as a charitable contribution under section 170 and was
not consideration for residential care received by the taxpayer
and her husband from a subsidiary of the "donee" corporation.
The court stressed that the key issue was the intent or motive of
the taxpayer. 8 In those cases where gifts had been disqualified as
charitable contributions "the donor-taxpayer was found to have
expected or anticipated the exchange benefit."7 Here, however,
the court held that there was "substantial evidence" 0 on which
the trial court could have based its finding that the gift had been
made "out of a detached and disinterested charitable and gener-
ous purpose," 81 and not in consideration for the lifetime housing,
care and other benefits received from the retirement village.
Cathleen Osborn Brandt
Constance C. Talmage
, U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
7 I.R.C. § 7203 provides penalties for willful failure to make a required tax return.
" 553 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1977).
, Id. at 1238.
7 Id. at 1239.
' There was conflicting testimony as to whether the taxpayer was aware that the
sponsorship gift was "requested" as a condition of admission to the retirement village. The
trial court found, however, that such a gift was not "required" and that almost one fourth
of the residents did not give the suggested amount. Id. at 1237.
AId.
1978

